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Abstract
This work analyzes the entry problem in the hydroelectric generation industry. The operation
of a generator upstream regularizes the river ﬂow for generators located downstream on the same
river, increasing the production capacity of the latter. This positive externality increases the attrac-
tiveness of the locations downstream whenever a generator decides to enter upstream. Therefore,
the entry decision of a generator in a given location may aﬀect all entry decisions in potential
locations for plants downstream. I ﬁrst model the problem of generators located in cascade on the
same river to show the positive eﬀect of the externality. Next, I develop a method to estimate
an entry model speciﬁc to the hydro generation industry which takes into account the externality
of the entry decisions. The speciﬁcity of the method derives from technological characteristics of
hydro generation, and signiﬁcantly simplify the estimation when compared to more standard entry
models. Finally, I use a data set on investment decisions of Brazilian hydro-generators to esti-
mate the model. The results show a positive incentive to locate downstream from existing plants
and from locations where entry is likely to occur. Location characteristics also play an important
role on the entrants’ decisions. An interesting by-product of the analysis is that the year eﬀects’
estimates show an increase one year before the energy crisis of 2001, providing evidence that the
market anticipated the crisis. It contradicts the governmental version that the crisis was due to an
unexpected drought.
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11 Introduction
This work analyzes the entry problem in the hydroelectric generation industry. The op-
eration of a generator upstream regularizes the river ﬂow for generators located downstream
on the same river, increasing the production capacity of the latter.1 This positive external-
ity increases the attractiveness of the locations downstream whenever a generator decides to
enter upstream. Therefore, the entry decision of a generator in a given location may aﬀect
all entry decisions in locations downstream. I ﬁrst model the problem of generators located
in cascade on the same river to show the positive eﬀect of the externality. Next, I develop
a method to estimate an entry model speciﬁc to the hydro generation industry which takes
into account the externality of the entry decisions. The speciﬁcity of the method derives
from technological characteristics of hydro generation, and signiﬁcantly simplify the estima-
tion when compared to more standard entry models. Finally, I use a data set on investment
decisions of Brazilian hydro-generators to estimate the model.
The empirical results show that ﬁrms have a positive incentive to locate downstream and
that location characteristics matter on the decision to enter. The externality has a positive
eﬀect on entry decisions and is an increasing function of the regularization of the river
ﬂow done by the upstream plants, and a decreasing function of the distance between them.
In rivers with several available locations there is also an incentive to locate downstream,
since entrants take into account the probability that entry occur in the locations upriver.
The physical and geographical characteristics of each location also play a strong role in the
entrant’s decision. The model identiﬁes a pattern on the entry dynamics of new hydro-
generators: once someone enters in a given location, entry becomes more likely to happen
on the downstream locations of that same river.
The year eﬀects estimates of the entry model capture the variation in market conditions
for the diﬀerent years covered by the sample, and can be understood as an average for the
non-observable prices of the bilateral contracts, that governs most of the electricity trade.
1In this context, regularization means a reduction in the variance of the river ﬂow.
1Interestingly, these estimates show an improvement in market conditions one year before
the crisis of 2001, when spot prices reached unprecedent high levels (see Figure 3). It
indicates that the market anticipated the net excess demand that would take place in the
months to come. This conclusion has three strong implications. First, it contradicts the
government’s claim that the crisis was due to an unexpected drought. If the crisis was truly
unexpected, no anticipation would exist. Second, despite high sunk costs and uncertainty
about future market conditions, investments in hydro-generation did respond to an expected
excess demand, which absolves the market design of any blame for ineﬀectiveness. In fact, the
crisis happened due to the length of time required for new plants to begin operating. Last,
despite the fact that the market anticipated the crisis, the centralized dispatch algorithm
failed in preventing it. Few months before the crisis the ISO was still dispatching the hydro
plants instead of turning on the thermo generators.
I take advantage of information on the entry order to analyze one commonly used as-
sumption in the empirical literature on entry: that entry occurs at the same time. Since
my data set has information on the entry order I estimate the model with both the entry
order and without it. The results show that not taking the entry order into account, and
estimating a one shot entry game where everyone enter at the same time, overestimates the
externality eﬀect and the interactions of the agents.
1.1 Background
The Brazilian electricity industry has undergone major reforms during the 90’s. A broad
privatization and deregulation process changed the industry from a state-owned vertically
integrated monopoly to a private industry separated in the three diﬀerent segments of gen-
eration, transmission and distribution. The main purposes of the reforms were to increase
eﬃciency and to attract private capital to the sector.
Among the major changes was the creation of a market for long term contracts of electric-
ity supply, as a way to introduce competition in the generation segment. Generators would
2be free to negotiate contracts with consumers, which would create competition for better
deals. The market would provide incentive for eﬃcient behavior on the ﬁrm’s side and would
have a price that would work as a signal for new investments in electricity generation.
In 2001, ﬁve years after the reforms took place, Brazil went through its most severe
energy crisis ever. An unexpected dry Summer2 caught the water levels of the dams of the
Brazilian system at an already low level leading to a water shortage that culminated in a
rationing of electricity consumption with penalties for over-consumption. Unclear market
rules led to major lawsuits from diﬀerent parties, leaving the electricity market in complete
chaos.
The oﬃcial government explanation for the crisis was the unexpected drought of the ﬁrst
months of 2001 that added to a series of unfavorable rain seasons in the previous years,
leading to the acute water shortage of 2001. However, critics of the reforms argued that
the crisis was in fact the consequence of mis-designed market rules. More speciﬁcally, they
argued that the price from the market for contracts of electricity supply was not able to
attract enough investments in new generation capacity. They also claimed that due to the
high sunk costs and number of years required for the new plants to start operating, entry
of new plants should be the result of a centralized decision and should not be left to a
decentralized market.
In order to analyze how investments in new plants respond to diﬀerent market conditions
one would need information on prices and on the proﬁtability of the plants and how invest-
ment in new plants followed. The problem is that even after the reforms, the electricity
industry in Brazil (and mostly elsewhere) is characterized as being centralized and regulated
(section 2 discusses the Brazilian market in more depth). The generation segment operates
under centralized dispatch of an ISO (Independent System Operator) that calculates through
the solution of a computer algorithm the cost of the water stored in each generation plant,
and based on these results determines the production of each plant. Therefore, generators
2Summer is the rain season for most part of Brazil.
3do not determine the quantity they produce. Also, generators are paid according to their
long term production capacity (called assured energy) instead of their actual production.
The spot market is a residual market that is used to adjust for short term ﬂuctuations in
demand and supply. Around 90 percent of the trade happens through bilateral contracts,
which means that the spot price and quantity traded cannot be used to analyze the entry
decisions of new plants, since they are not representative of the proﬁtability of the plants.
The contract market is the only competitive segment in this industry. Unfortunately, the
price of the contract is a strategic information for generators and distributors and hence are
kept secret by the parties. However, the decision to enter the generation market is public
information and well documented. The literature on empirical entry models in industrial
organization (Bresnahan and Reiss [6] and [7], Berry [4] among others) provides a way to
estimate the proﬁt function of the entrant ﬁrms based solely on entry data, without having
information on prices and quantities. This is the method I follow in this paper.
However, when using the entry decisions to identify the proﬁt function one needs to take
into account one characteristic speciﬁc of hydroelectric generation: the externality in produc-
tion. The externality arises from the fact that the operation of a generation plant regularizes
the river ﬂow downstream, since it stores water during the rain season and release it while
generating electricity during the dry season. Other generation plants located downstream
on the same river beneﬁt from this regularization, since the upstream plant is in fact storing
water for all the other plants located downstream. A generator that otherwise would need a
large reservoir to store water from one season to another, can have an equivalent production
with a smaller reservoir if there is a plant operating upstream.
This paper develops an entry model that takes this interaction into account. In this
context, the externality is well deﬁned and it is a function of the decrease in the variance of
the river ﬂow. The technological characteristics of the production process gives rise to a well
deﬁned pattern of how the externality is generated and how it aﬀects the other plants. I take
advantage of these characteristics to propose a econometric method that is computationally
4simpler than more standard entry models and does not suﬀer from the common problem of
multiplicity of equilibria in entry games (see Berry [4], Seim [16] or more recently Andrews
et al [1] for more on the problem of multiplicity of equilibria).
This work relates to the empirical literature on entry models in industrial organization.
There is a large literature on this ﬁeld, most of them using entry decisions to access market
power: Bresnahan and Reiss [6] and [7], Berry [4] etc. However, it has a closer analogy to
the work of Seim [16] and Mazzeo [13], where the decision to enter is made together with a
location decision. The location can refer either to a product or a geographical space. The
location decision in their models is driven by the trade oﬀ between diﬀerentiating and locating
closer to higher demand locations; the degree of competition among products depends on
the distance between competitors. The analogy with the problem studied here is that ﬁrms
also decide if enter and where to locate. However, the location choices here are with respect
to production and costs, and they depend on the physical characteristics of the locations
and on the externality of production among the generators.
Analyzing the externality of entry decisions, the paper by Gowrisankaran and Stavins
[10] estimate the externality associated with the adoption of new technology by banks. In
their paper, the adoption of the new technology inﬂuences other banks decisions; banks that
do not adopt the new technology are not able to carry certain types of transactions with
other banks. While similar to this work for dealing with the problem of entry and externality
instead of market power, their paper does not deal with the location problem as done by
Seim [16] and Mazzeo [13]. In this paper I combine the two problems, with the externality
of one agent’s entry decision inﬂuencing the location decisions of other agents.
This paper also relates to the literature in spatial competition. Case et al [8] analyze
the continuous case where neighboring states compete in the amount of public expenditures.
Dealing with a spatial discrete choice problem, or spatial logit, Murdoch et al [14] estimate a
model where countries have to decide to join an environmental agreement, with the decision
5of a country having a negative externality on neighbor countries.3
Finally, there is a large literature about the actual performance of restructured electricity
markets, with several papers trying to analyze diﬀerent aspects of these markets. Borenstein
et al [5] uses a method that decompose the wholesale price of the California market into
costs, infra marginal rents, and market power gains to evaluate market ineﬃciencies during
the energy crisis of the year 2000.4 Wolfran [19] analyzes bid behavior in the British wholesale
market to identify departures from the competitive price. Ishii and Yan [12] look at the eﬀect
of changes in regulatory institutions on the option value of investing on new plants. These
and many other papers use methodologies that rely on information on price quantity and
costs to quantify market ineﬃciencies. The method I use in this paper requires only data on
entry decision to assess market performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the Brazilian electric system
and how investments in new facilities are made. In section 3 I present a theoretical model of
two generators located in cascade on the same river operating under decentralized dispatch,
and show that under non-restrictive assumptions the operation of the generator upstream
increases the proﬁtability of the generator downstream.
Section 4 describes the econometric entry model. It also describes the functional form
of the proﬁt function and the likelihood function used in the estimation. Section 5 is a
description of the data set. It is a panel containing data on the locations available for the
installation of new plants, from 1995 until 2002, with the locations chosen at each year and
the locations that remained available. Section 6 describes the econometric procedure and
presents the econometric results. Section 7 compare the results of estimating a model that
takes the entry order into account and one that does not. The last section concludes.
3Anselin [3] provides a survey on spatial econometrics and spatial discrete choice models.
4Numerous other papers try to analyze the California energy crisis. Refer to Borenstein et al [5] for more
references on this topic.
62 Investment in Electricity Generation
The Brazilian system is a predominantly hydroelectric system with approximately 90% of
all electricity generated hydrolically, with the remaining capacity generated thermally. The
generation system is operated under centralized dispatch by an ISO (Independent System
Operator) that is responsible for the dispatch of the generation plants. A computer algorithm
calculates the optimal dispatch by minimizing the probability of future water shortages. As a
result, the generators are dispatched in a merit order: the plants with the lowest opportunity
cost of water are the ﬁrst to be dispatched, and more plants are added to the process up to
the point where supply meets demand.
There are 4 sub-markets within the Brazilian market: North, South, Southeast/West
Central and Northeast. The sub-markets are deﬁned due to signiﬁcant restrictions on the
transmission lines between the regions, compared to no signiﬁcant restrictions within it. The
sub-markets can have diﬀerent prices due to transmission constraints on peak times.
Investment in hydroelectric generation is done through a concession process where in-
vestors submit bids for the right to explore the hydroelectric potential of a given location.
The available locations come from a list of possible locations provided by ANA (Agˆ encia
Nacional de ´ Agua), which is the government body that regulates the use of water resources.
When investors show interest in a speciﬁc location, a public concession process takes place,
with several investors submitting technical proposals and bids for that location. Among the
technical proposals that qualify, the greatest bid wins the right to build and operate the
plant for the next thirty or forty years.
The choice of maximum generation capacity and the size of the reservoir of the generation
plant are limited by natural characteristics of the location, and determined by the regulatory
agency. Investors are not allowed to build a small reservoir in a location with capacity for
a large one. On the other hand it is usually very costly to expand the reservoir beyond
some natural limits. The engineering parameters of each location (area and volume of the
reservoir, maximum installed power etc) are given when a potential investor decides to bid
7for the right to explore a location.
Most of the electricity is traded through bilateral contracts between generators and con-
sumers, usually distribution companies or large users, and only a small fraction on the spot
market. The Brazilian system adopts a payment scheme called MRE (Mecanismo de Realo-
cac˜ ao de Energia), Mechanism to Relocate Energy, where the energy produced by all plants
is pooled together and allocated to generators in proportion to their long term production
capacity, also called assured energy (energia assegurada). In this way, generators are not
paid by their actual production but by their assured energy. The assured energy is also the
maximum amount of electricity per period that a generator can contract with the distri-
bution companies. The MRE works as a risk sharing mechanism to mitigate the risk of a
plant not being dispatched by the ISO, say due to a drought, not being able to deliver the
contracted energy and, consequently, have no revenue for long periods of time.
Each year the distribution companies forecast what is going to be the demand ﬁve years
ahead, the average time of installation of a new plant. The positive diﬀerence between
the forecasted demand and what they have already contracted is the potential demand for
contracts with new entrants, assuming all energy supplied by the existing plants is already
contracted.5 Given these demand conditions, potential investors negotiate with distribution
companies the price of the new energy. If we consider electricity an approximated homo-
geneous good that can be transmitted for long distances through the transmission network
and that congestion happens only between diﬀerent regions, we can assume that there is a
unique contracted price within each region at each period.6
5More than 90% of the energy produced in Brazil is traded through contracts.
6Electricity can be considered a homogeneous good up to the fact that there are transmission losses when
transmitting for long distances and congestions between regions.
82.1 The MRE and the Financial Closure of the System:
An Example
In order to understand how the ﬁnancial closure of the system operates under the MRE,
consider a system composed of only two generators, A and B, and two distribution companies,
D1 and D2. Table 1 shows the quantities and prices contracted among them.
Table 1: Contracts
D1 D2
qc pc qc pc
A 100 1 - -
B 50 1.5 40 2
I assume that both generators contract all their assured energy, therefore A’s assured















Where ps is the spot price of the system and qg and qd are the generated and consumed
quantities, respectively.
The MRE is a risk sharing mechanism that allocates the energy produced across the dif-
ferent plants, changing the quantity generated qg in equation (1), by the quantity determined








Table 2 shows two diﬀerent situations. On situation 1 the system as a whole produces
a quantity that is equal to the assured (contracted) energy of the system. In this case, the
9MRE allocation guarantees that both plants have the contracted energy as the produced
energy, so the generators do not trade on the spot market. Situation 2 shows the system
producing less than the assured energy. The MRE allocation is then proportional to the
assured energy of each plant. In this situation everyone trades on the spot market. One
feature of the MRE, in fact its main purpose, is that it reduces the variance of the generator’s
revenue, as can be seen in the last two columns of the table.
Table 2: MRE - quantities and revenue
Prod/Cons MRE Spot Market Rev/Pay Rev/Pay
q q q MRE without MRE
Situation 1 q=AE
A 80,0 100,0 0,0 100,0 90,0
B 110,0 90,0 0,0 155,0 165,0
D1 100,0 - -50,0 150,0 150,0
D2 90,0 - 50,0 105,0 105,0
Situation 2 q < AE
A 50,0 57,9 -42,1 78,9 75,0
B 60,0 52,1 -37,9 136,1 140,0
D1 60,0 - -90,0 130,0 130,0
D2 50,0 - 10,0 85,0 85,0
3 Externality in Production
Generation plants located on the same river have production externalities among each
other, with generators located upstream regularizing the river ﬂow for generators located
downstream. Before trying to estimate the eﬀect of this externality on the entry probability
I present a theoretical model of two generators operating on the same river to show that
the operation of the plant located upstream creates a positive externality, increasing the
proﬁtability of the plant located downstream. I also present some characteristics of this ex-
ternality which will be used in the next section to deﬁne the functional form of the externality
in the empirical estimation.
I consider the case of a generator that decides its own production, as opposed to operate
10under centralized dispatch. It simpliﬁes the problem, since in the decentralized case each
generator decides production by maximizing its own utility. The diﬀerence between the
optimal policies of the two problems is due to the externality, that is taken into account in
the centralized dispatch case.7
The generator’s problem consists of deciding when to use the water it has stored in its
reservoir to produce energy. Diﬀerent market conditions, with diﬀerent prices, and a varying
stock of water is what poses the trade oﬀ between producing power today or in the future.
I assume that prices are given for the generators, ruling out any type of strategic behavior
to try to aﬀect prices and market conditions. This assumption is reasonable in the case of a
sizable market with a large number of generators connected to a transmission grid that covers
diﬀerent regions without major transmission constraints. It approximates the conditions
found in Brazil.8
The problem analyzed here consists of two generators located in cascade on the same
river, with generator 1 located upstream from plant 2, as shown in Figure 1. I represent the
river by D discrete points. The amount of rain that falls in each period at every point along
the river is represented by a stochastic variable , with f() being its probability density.
For simplicity, rain is iid both geographically and across time.9
The amount of water that reaches the reservoir of generator 1 is given by the amount of
rain that falls upstream from plant 1. Generator 2 is located at the end of the river with
generator 1 located at a distance of d from generator 2. The river spring is at a distance
D from plant 2, as shown in Figure 1. The amount of rain that reaches plant 1 is given by
r1 =
PD
i=d i. On the other hand, the water that reaches generator 2 is the sum of the water
used by generator 1 to produce electricity and the amount of rain that falls on the stretch of
7The externality in production in hydroelectric systems is one of the reasons used to justify having
centralized dispatch.
8An interesting case would be found in a small or isolated market, where the plants could aﬀect the
market price by strategic manipulating the supply of electricity. Garcia et al [9] analyze a duopoly game of
hydroelectric generators managing their stock of water and selling electricity on the spot market.
9A more realistic assumption could be made about the rain pattern, such as following a Markov process,
without changing the main results of the model.
11river that lies between the two plants. The amount of water that reaches generator 2’s dam
is r2 = q1 +
Pd−1
i=0 i.
The chronological order of events is the following: it rains at the beginning of the period,
at the end of the period electricity production takes place and the remaining water on the
reservoir will be the initial stock in the next period. The water used by plant 1 reaches plant
2 on the same period.
To simplify the analysis, I assume a one to one relation between water and energy pro-
duced. It means that one unit of water stored in the reservoir produces one unit of energy.
In fact, a more realistic production function is nonlinear in the height of the water surface
relative to the turbine located at the base of the reservoir. Taking this into account implies
that the productivity of a unit of water changes with the state of the dam. I abstract away
from these technical consideration in this work.
The production of generators 1 and 2 is constrained by the amount of water they have
in their reservoirs and by the amount of rain that falls in the period. The amount of water
in the dam is constrained by the maximum storage capacity of the reservoir, as given by the
following inequalities:
qi ≤ Xi + ri, for i = 1,2 (4)
Xi ≤ ¯ Xi, for i = 1,2 (5)
Where qi is the quantity produced, Xi is the amount of water stored in the dam, ri is
the amount of water that reaches the plant in one period and ¯ Xi is the maximum storage
capacity of the reservoir. It is important to note that electricity can be produced by using
both water stored in the reservoir and/or the river ﬂow in location i given by ri. It implies
that a generation plant with a reservoir of size zero, ¯ Xi = 0, must have Xi = 0 and qi ≤ ri.
The law of motion of the amount of water stored in reservoir i is given by,
X
0
i ≤ Xi + ri − qi;for i = 1,2 (6)
12where the inequality sign represents the possibility that the reservoir spills water if it is full,
X = ¯ X. In the law of motion of generator 2, r2 depends on plant’s 1 production plus the
rain that falls between the two plants.
Let p be the price of electricity in a given period, and g(p) its probability distribution.
Also, let C(q) be the cost function of the plant, with C
0 > 0 and C
00 > 0. A generator
maximizes proﬁt by solving the following dynamic programming problem:
V (X,p) = max
q
n







Subject to equations (4) (5) and (6).
Equation (7) is the Bellman equation solved by the generator to determine its optimal
policy. The expectation of the future value is taking with respect to the probability distri-
bution of rain fall and price.
In order to show that the eﬀect of the externality is positive, we need to verify that (i)
the smaller variance (regularization) of the river due to the operation of plant 1 upstream in-
creases the production of generator 2 and (ii) that the optimal production policy of generator
1 regularizes the river ﬂow.
Proposition 1 The regularization of the river ﬂow by generator 1 (upstream) increases the
value of generator 2 (downstream).
Proof. In order to show that the value of generator 2 increases with the operation of
generator 1, it is suﬃcient to show that a generator’s value function is concave. Recall that
the amount of water that ﬂows through plant 2 is the same both with or without plant 1
upstream.











0 ≤ X + r − q.







≤ X + r − q
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is convex and compact, then the operator T maps a continuous bounded function V in to
a continuous bounded function TV , and it satisﬁes the Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions to
be a contraction mapping. Stokey and Lucas with Prescott [17] show that T maps concave
functions into concave functions, and therefore the solution to V = TV is a concave function.
Therefore, we only need to show that these properties hold in these cases in order to be able
to apply their results here.
Since p,q ∈ R and C
00 > 0, we have that π is indeed a real valued, continuous and concave
function. Boundedness comes from the fact that the monopoly proﬁt bounds this function
above and the possibility of shutting down in face of negative proﬁt bounds it below. The
set S is clearly convex and compact.
Proposition 2 The optimal policy of generator 1 located upstream, regularizes (reduces the
variance) the river ﬂow.
Proof. We want to show that the variance of the optimal policy q∗ is smaller than the
variance of rainfall r. For this purpose it is suﬃcient to show that 0 < ∂q∗/∂r < 1.
Considering the case where the law of motion binds and substituting it into the Bellman
equation we have,
V (X,p) = max
q
n
p.q − C(q) + βEV

X + r − q,p
0o





(X + r − q,p
0
) = 0





00(X + r − q,p
0)
βEV
00(X + r − q,p
0) − C
00
Using the fact that the value function is concave and the cost function is convex we have
0 < ∂q∗/∂r < 1.
Theorem 1 The production of electricity by a generator located in a given river has a pos-
itive externality on the generators located downstream on the same river.
Proof. If the production of a generator upstream regularizes the river ﬂow, it increases the
value of generators downstream as long as their value functions are concave. Propositions 1
and 2 show that both conditions hold.
The idea is that the reservoir of generator 1 is in fact holding water for generator 2 as
well. Generator 1 holds water in the rain season and release it during the dry season. This
is a positive externality of the ﬁrst generator’s reservoir management. The regularization of
the water inﬂow into generator 2, as compared to the greater variance of the occurrence of
rains, is the externality of the operation of generator 1 upstream. It is important to note
that as much as this result depends on the technological characteristics of production in this
industry, it also depends on the fact that generators upstream are maximizing proﬁts and
on the assumption that the price is exogenous.
One corollary of this result is that the eﬀect of the externality of the operation of 1 in 2
depends on the distance between the two plants. The closer plant 1 locates to plant 2 the
higher the eﬀect of the externality, since a smaller stretch of the river will be subject to the
higher variance of the rain pattern. To see this consider the case where plant 1 can locate in
two diﬀerent points along the river, r and r0, with r0 more downstream than r. Since each
distance measure along the river has a one to one relationship with the amount of rain that
falls downstream from this point, without loss of generality, normalize the expected amount
of rain that falls in each location to one, ¯  = 1. With this normalization r and r0 now are
15also equal to the expected amount of rain that falls downstream from them. The following
corollary states it formally.
Corollary 2 The eﬀect of the externality generated by a plant upstream decreases as the
distance between the plants increase.
Proof. Since r0 < r we want to show that V ar(r) + V ar(q∗
r) > V ar(r0) + V ar(q∗
r0). The
water inﬂow into plant 2 when plant 1 is located in r is q∗
r + r, hence the variance of the
water inﬂow in plant 2 is V ar(q∗
r + r) = V ar(q∗
r) + V ar(r), while if plant 1 locates in
r0 the variance is V ar(q∗
r0 + r0) = V ar(q∗
r0) + V ar(r0). For a plant located in r we can
write V ar(q∗
r) + V ar(r) = V ar(q∗
r) + V (r − r0) + V ar(r0), so we only need to compare
V ar(q∗
r) + V (r − r0) with V ar(q∗
r0). The plant located in r0 is located r − r0 closer to plant
2 than the plant in r. Proposition 2 states that the optimal policy has a smaller variance
than the variance of the rain fall, hence the plant in r0 is regularizing r − r0 more than the
plant in r, therefore, V ar(q∗
r) + V (r − r0) > V ar(q∗
r0)
4 An Entry Model with Externality
I assume that at each available location there is a potential entrant that in a given period
can choose between entering or not. If the agent decides to enter she will sign the contract
that will set the price for the following years, build the plant, operate it and get the pay oﬀ
of selling the electricity. If she decides not to enter she will not have the option to enter in
the next period. In other words, agents have only one opportunity to enter.
This assumption greatly simpliﬁes the problem since it avoids any dynamic consideration
on the timing of the entry decision, and it is based on the fact that there is no real value of
waiting to enter in this industry. This can be justiﬁed by two speciﬁcities of this industry.
First, the value of waiting (also known as option value) derives from the fact that enter
can be made in a subsequent period if market conditions improve. It requires an agent to
be able to make the decision about entry in the next period. But it is not necessarily the
16case here, since a diﬀerent entrant can enter at that speciﬁc location. The reason for this is
the limited number of locations available for entry, and the impossibility of being the only
possible entrant in a given location. It reduces the value of waiting to zero, since not entering
now does not guarantee the right to make the same decision next period. The second reason
is that the waiting value is based on the trade oﬀ between entering now or in the future.
Since most of the entrants in this industry are large ﬁrms with several plants operating in
diﬀerent locations, entering now in a given location does not prevent entry in the future.
Therefore, a more reasonable assumption is to assume that agents enter every time there
exists a positive proﬁt opportunity in a given location. Without the identity of the entrants,
it is equivalent to assuming that agents last only for one period.
I also assume that entrants are diﬀerentiated in their ability to operate a plant and sell
the electricity produced in a speciﬁc location. And that this ability is not observed by the
other entrants or by the econometrician. In fact, entrants are identical in the observable
characteristics but distinct in the unobservable characteristics. This unobserved character-
istic is private information of the entrant, which introduces asymmetry of information into
the problem. This assumption implies that the proﬁt of a generator i is determined by two
distinct components: an observable part Ωjt, a function of the plant’s characteristics and
time, and an unobservable part µj + εjt, that account both the unobserved characteristics
of the location and the speciﬁc ability of the entrant to operate the plant. The unobserved
characteristics of the locations are observed by the entrants but not by the econometrician.
The proﬁt function can then be written as
πjt = Ωjt + µj + εjt (8)
It makes the entry problem an incomplete information game where players form expec-
tations about the other players’ proﬁts and actions. The solution concept used is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium where strategies are ex-ante optimal. This is the same concept used in
Seim’s [16] study of the video retail industry. In this type of equilibrium there can be ex-
17post regret about the entry decision. This type of assumption is especially reasonable in
industries with high sunk costs as electricity generation, due to the mispracticality of revert-
ing investments in new facilities. Ex-post regret only occurs in entry games with complete
information if players use mixed strategy.
The idiosyncratic ability of the entrants ε represents the type of the entrant in the asym-
metric information problem, which is modeled as an iid random variable with probability
density h(ε). Agents will form expectation about other agent’s actions based on the distri-
bution h(.).
There is a list of J diﬀerent locations available {1,...J}. The locations chosen in period t
will not be available in t+1. Let πjt be the long term proﬁt of entering location j in period
t. An agent will enter in location j if the proﬁt of entering is greater than zero. The decision




doesn’t enter if πjt < 0
enter if πjt ≥ 0
(9)
4.1 The Functional Form of the Proﬁt Function
The investment decision is based on the expected long term proﬁt, as shown in equation
9. Two important institutional features of the Brazilian market imply a speciﬁc functional
form for the proﬁt function. First, most of the energy is traded through long term bilateral
contracts, implying that the price used to calculate the discounted cash ﬂow is ﬁxed on the
relevant time horizon. This is important since it excludes uncertainty about future prices.
And second, under the MRE, generators do not get paid according to their productions but
according to their assured energy, which is ﬁxed for long periods of time. These features
signiﬁcantly simplify the analysis since the payments received by a generator do not depend
on her current stock of water or on the expected rain.
18The proﬁt function of an agent entering in location j in period t is given by
πjt = π(Zj,Extjt,φt,µj,εjt) (10)
Where Zj is the set of characteristics that aﬀect both the proﬁtability and the investment cost
of the plant, Extjt is the externality that generators upstream from j generate in period t, φt
is the time eﬀect on the proﬁtability of the plants, µj is an unobserved by the econometrician
characteristic of the plant and εjt is the unobserved type of the entrant that aﬀects proﬁt.
It is worth noting that the fact that the contract keeps the price ﬁxed for the relevant
time horizon, together with the generator receiving according to the assured energy and not
by the quantity produced, simplify the problem faced by the generator. In this case the
important variables are location ( each location already has Zj deﬁned), the unobservable
contract price and the externality Extjt. Based on these variables the agent decides whether
to enter or not. This diﬀers from the case where generators are paid according to the quantity
produced and trade occurs in the spot market with prices changing over time. If this was
the case, the expected cash ﬂow would be the solution of the dynamic programming problem
analyzed in the section 3, where generators allocate water across time to maximize proﬁt.
The assured energy depends on the size of the reservoir, the maximum power capacity
and on the water inﬂow and its variability. The latter depends on the operation of plants
located upstream, and therefore is aﬀected by the externality of being downstream. Since
it is unknown how the hydrological regime and the externality aﬀect the assured energy I
choose to use a proﬁt function where all the variables that aﬀect the assured energy enter
linearly in the equation. I assume the functional form of the investment cost to be linear
since several variables that aﬀect the assured energy also aﬀect the investment cost such as
maximum power generation capacity and volume of the dam. The drawback of this approach
is that I am not be able to separate the eﬀect of some of the variables on the revenue stream
19from the investment cost. The advantage is that I do not have to make strong assumptions
about the technology of production and the investment cost function.
The contract price is strategic and highly secret information for the generators and, hence,
unknown to the econometrician. The year dummies capture the market conditions for each
year, therefore including the eﬀect of price and risk on the proﬁtability.
The functional form of the proﬁt function becomes,
πjt = Zjβ + Extjt + φt + µj + εjt (11)
Note that εjt is indexed on t since on each period a diﬀerent entrant with diﬀerent ability can
choose to enter the market. I also assume that εjt has a type I extreme value distribution
and µj is distributed as a normal with mean c and variance σ2, N(c,σ2).
To model the externality eﬀect I separate it in two components: the ﬁrst is the regular-
izations of the river ﬂow done by the upstream plant and the second is the distance from
the plant to the generator downstream. The regularization of the river ﬂow over time by
the upstream plant is deﬁned by the storage capacity of the reservoir relative to the river
ﬂow. The higher the size of the dam relative to the river ﬂow the higher the regularization.
And how the regularization aﬀects the plants located downstream depends on the distance
between them. The general form for the externality eﬀect on plant j when plant i operates
upstream is Extj = g(dij)reg(voli,flowi), where dij is the distance between the two plants
and g(.) is a decreasing function of the distance, and reg(.) is a function that depends on
the reservoir’s volume and river ﬂow.
For the ﬁrst term of the externality equation I assume that g(dij) = 1/dij. For the second
term I use the following speciﬁcation:
regi = (voli/flowi) (12)







Where ∆j is the set of locations upstream from location j.
Deﬁne Pit as the probability of an entrant entering in location i upstream in period t.







If at the beginning of period t there is already a plant operating in one or more of the
upstream locations, Pit = 1 for these locations.
After deﬁning the functional form of the proﬁt and the externality function, the next
step is to calculate the entry probability which will be used in the estimation procedure.
4.2 The Entry Probability
In order to illustrate how the probability of entry is calculated and some features of the
equilibrium of the entry game I ﬁrst show the entry problem of one generator with no plants
or locations upstream, then I show the case of a generator with only one plant upstream and
then the generalization to the case of N plants.
In the case of a generator with no possible location for plants upriver, the decision to
enter depends on its own proﬁtability only. A potential entrant in location i enters in period
t if πit > 0. Given µi, the probability of entering is,
Pit = Pit(enter|µi) = P(πit > 0|µi) = P(Ωit + µi + εit > 0) = P(εit > −(Ωit + µi)). (15)
Where Ωit = Ziβ + φt is the observable part of proﬁts. Since I assume ε to have a type 1




1 + eΩit+µi (16)
The decision of a second generator between entering or not in a location j downstream
depends on the decision of generator i upstream. Since the entrant in j does not know what
the entrant in i will do in period t, her decision is based on her assessment of the probability
that i enters and the expected proﬁt derived from it. The expected proﬁt of an entrant in j
in time t becomes,
Eπjt = Ωjt + Ext
i
jPit + µj + εjt (17)
Therefore, the conditional entry probability in j is
Pjt = P(Eπjt(Pit) > 0) (18)
Consider now the case of N locations on the same river, and order the plants such that
the most upstream plant is 1, the second most upstream is 2 and so on. Given the vector Z
of plant characteristics, the year eﬀects and the coeﬃcients of the model we can write the
probabilities of these plants as a system of equations:
P1t = P(Ω1t + µ1 + ε1t > 0)
P2t = P(Ω2t + Ext
1
2P1t + µ2 + ε2t > 0)
: (19)





NPit + µN + εNt > 0)
It is easy to see that this system can be solved in a recursive fashion: calculate P1t
ﬁrst, then use P1t to ﬁnd P2t and so on. The fact that the system can be solved in this
22way indicates that there is a unique solution to this problem, and therefore there is no
multiplicity of equilibria in the entry game. Heckman [11] has shown that, if the distribution
of the random component is continuous with support RN, a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for a discrete choice model with strategic interactions to have a unique solution is to have
a recursive solution. The fact that the externality occurs from plants upstream to plants
downstream makes the problem recursive, together with the assumption that the random
components are iid and have a extreme value type I distribution guaranteed that the result
holds in this case. The fact that the externality occurs in only one direction avoid the
problem of multiplicity of equilibria.
For each diﬀerent river basin I solve for the probabilities using the system described in
(20). After solving for the conditional entry probabilities for all periods in the sample, the






jt (1 − Pjt)
1−yjt (20)
Since the ε’s are iid over time, and yjt takes value 1 if entry happens and 0 otherwise. The





Since I assume that µ is distributed as a normal N(c,σ2), the integral in (21) needs to be
numerically calculated.





It is important to note that the interaction among the ﬁrm’s actions is limited to entry on
the same river basin (the main river and subsidiaries) only. Entry in diﬀerent rivers basins are
23independent. Also, the recursiveness of the model comes from the fact that entry decisions
aﬀect only generators downstream. It signiﬁcantly reduces the computational burden of
the estimation, since it avoids the task of of numerically solving a simultaneous system of
equations to calculate the probabilities.
5 Data
I use data from two diﬀerent sources. Data about the locations with geographical char-
acteristics and technical parameters of the power plants comes from the SIPOT database.
This is a broad dataset elaborated by Eletrobras, the state owned enterprise responsible
for the identiﬁcation of locations with hydroelectric generation potential. It contains data
about all existing hydroelectric plants and possible locations for installation of new plants in
Brazil, including locations where only a very preliminary analysis was made. In this work I
consider as locations available for concession the places where the technical parameters such
as maximum power capacity, volume, height and area of the reservoir are already deﬁned.
It excludes locations with viability studies at a very preliminary stage. The geographical
position of the locations used in the sample are shown in Figure 2.
Data about the entry over the period analyzed comes from ANEEL, the body that reg-
ulates the electricity industry. They have a dataset containing all the concession contracts
negotiated since 1993.10 I use data from concessions realized from 1995 thereafter, since this
year marks the beginning of the reforms in the Brazilian electric system. There is information
about the year the entry occurred and the location of the plant.
I merge the two datasets to have characteristics of the locations together with informa-
tion on entry. The data is organized as a panel of locations available for concession for
hydroelectric generation. Once a location is chosen and entry occur, this place gets out of
the sample. Further, since I do not have information when a location become available for
concession I assume that all the available locations considered in the sample were available
10The concession contracts are available at ANEEL website http://www.aneel.gov.br/
24in 1995. It makes the dataset an unbalanced panel that shrinks over time since locations
drop out of the sample as they are chosen and no new locations enter the sample over this
period.
The distance between plants/locations on the same river I calculated using the polar
coordinates from each plant, an information contained in the SIPOT database. The fact that
rivers wind around the landscape makes the distance between two plants when following the
river to be signiﬁcantly more than if measured as the distance of two points on the Earth
surface. So to calculate these distances I marked the coordinates of the plants on Google
Earth and draw paths following the river curse to ﬁnd the distance between the plants.11
Table 3 summarizes the main explanatory variables used in the estimation.
Table 3: Summary of Data
Variables mean median max min stand dev
Power (MW) 460 140 11000 32 1147
Height (m) 72 50 594 9 73
Area (m2) 197 33 6140 0 612
Flow (hm3) 951 238 17926 5 2207
DistSIN (Km) 62 23 1000 0 127
N 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.3
NE 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.3
S 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.4
SE/WC 0.6 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5
Power is the installed capacity of a generator and aﬀects its maximum production ca-
pacity, as well as the installation costs. Height is the distance between the highest possible
water level to the base of the water fall. Area is the area of the dam when it is full. N
NE S and SE/WC are dummy for the diﬀerent regions of the country, and they compare
to the Southeast-West Central region, that I take to be the base region. The main demand
centers are located on the Southeast, the more populated and industrialized region. I group
together SE and WC since they are electrically well integrated, without transmission re-
strictions between the two regions. DistSIN is the distance between the generator and the
11A Google Earth ﬁle with all the locations from the sample marked on the Brazilian territory is available
on my webpage, https://netﬁles.uiuc.edu/moita/www/.
25main transmission line. Since investors are required to build the connection to the main
transmission lines, it accounts for the cost of building the connection.
Table 4 shows the distribution of the number of ﬁrms and entry over the years covered
by the sample.
Table 4: Locations and Entry











Table 5 gives the maximum likelihood estimates of the full model deﬁned in equation
(22). The table presents the results of the full model and the results from the model without
the random eﬀects. The full model has higher coeﬃcients than the model with no random
eﬀects.
All coeﬃcients have the expected sign. Power is related both to the production capacity
of a generator and therefore to its revenue stream, as well as with the investment cost -
larger plants have both a higher maximum power capacity and a higher cost. The coeﬃcient
can be interpreted as the net eﬀect of power on proﬁts, with the results showing a positive
but not signiﬁcant eﬀect. The positive coeﬃcient may indicate the existence of economies of
scale and/or market power. With the available data it is not possible to distinguish between
the two eﬀects.
Height increases the generation capacity of the plants and it is a good indicator of the
26energetic eﬃciency of the location, as corroborated by the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
obtained on both speciﬁcations. Everything else constant, deep dams are better than shallow
ones for two reasons: ﬁrst, they can generate more power using the same amount of water
and second, they can have the same power capacity as larger and more shallow plants but
ﬂood a smaller area. The ﬂooded area represents the main cost of installing a new plant.
The acquisition of the land, together with the remotion of whole villages, farms, domestic
and wild animal population, plus the environmental cost of ﬂooding in many cases forested
areas represents the main component of the installation cost. When controlling for power
and height, the variable area captures this eﬀect and gives a good approximation of the
environmental cost of installing a plant. The coeﬃcients are negative and signiﬁcant in both
models.12
The region dummies N NE and S also carry two eﬀects: diﬀerence in installation costs
and congestion risk across the regions. Since the main load centers are located in the South-
east, plants located in diﬀerent regions are likely to contract with consumers located in the
SE. There are signiﬁcant restrictions on the transmission among the regions in peak times
and consequently diﬀerent market prices in these hours. A plant located in the North but
contracted with a consumer in the SE has to buy electricity from a generator in the SE in
case there is congestion between the North and the Southeast and not all the contracted
electricity can be delivered from the North. This electricity will be bought at the spot price
for the sub-market SE, which will be higher than the price for the North if the transmission
lines are congested in the N-SE direction. Also, diﬀerent regions can have diﬀerent costs to
install a new plant.
The coeﬃcients obtained for N NE and S are in relation to the SE-CW region and are
negative for the regions South and Northeast and positive for the North in the full model. The
similar geographic characteristics of the South and the Southeast indicates that congestion
may aﬀect the proﬁtability in the South. The same cannot be said about the Northeast.
12The construction of the dam’s wall plus the installation of the turbines represents a smaller share of
the investment cost.
27Table 5: Full Model Estimation
Full Model No Random Effects
Coef. Std. Dev. Coef. Std. Dev.
Power 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
Height 0.0068 ∗∗ 0.0030 0.0031∗∗ 0.0015
Area -0.0030 ∗ 0.0021 -0.0021∗∗ 0.0010
DistSIN -0.0093 ∗∗ 0.0054 -0.0065∗∗ 0.0029
N 0.0038 0.8773 -0.0263 0.5241
NE -2.0506 ∗∗ 1.1589 -1.6232∗∗ 0.7688
S -0.5596 0.5334 -0.4171∗ 0.3232
D96 0.0952 1.1019 -0.3492 0.9328
D97 1.6812 ∗∗ 0.9090 0.9004 0.7232
D98 2.9157 ∗∗ 0.9649 1.8772∗∗ 0.6484
D99 1.0889 1.2034 -0.1670 0.9401
D00 3.2357 ∗∗ 1.1193 1.9886∗∗ 0.6701
D01 4.2090 ∗∗ 1.2934 2.5172∗∗ 0.6231
D02 4.6992 ∗∗ 1.4851 2.6771∗∗ 0.6273
Ext 0.3080 ∗∗ 0.1346 0.2408∗∗ 0.0849
c -5.4625 ∗∗ 1.1358 -3.6370∗∗ 0.5708
σ 1.4779 ∗∗ 0.8043
** Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
* Signiﬁcant at the 20 percent level.
However, none of them is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero. DistSIN has a negative impact
on proﬁts through ﬁxed costs, since generators have to build the connection from the plant
to the main transmission system.
The variable Ext captures the eﬀect of the externality and therefore estimate the inter-
action of the entry decisions. The entry probability depends on the probability of other
generators entering upstream, and measures the eﬀect of having plants operating upstream
on the entry decision. As previously discussed, in theory the externality is expected to have
a positive eﬀect on proﬁts and on the entry decision. The estimated coeﬃcient is positive
and signiﬁcant as predicted by the theory. It means that the weighted sum of the volume
per ﬂow ratio of the plants upstream has a positive eﬀect on the proﬁtability.
The coeﬃcients c and σ are the mean and variance of the random eﬀect. The negative
mean is due to the fact that there are more observations of no entry than entry in the
dataset. The variance measures the unobserved heterogeneity of the plants, with the results
28indicating a signiﬁcant degree of unobserved diﬀerence among the plants.
Since I am not including any information on the demand for electricity in the regression
equation, the year dummies capture the eﬀect of market conditions on proﬁts, and conse-
quently on entry. The high increase in the last three years of the sample matches with the
severe water shortfall that occurred in Brazil in 2001 (see Figure 3), that culminated on a
rationing of electricity consumption with penalties for household consumption above certain
levels, and very high spot prices on the electricity wholesale market.
The high coeﬃcient for the year 2000 can be interpreted as if the market anticipated
the crisis of 2001, with a large number of plants entering the market one year before the
crisis. This is a controversial point since the government at that time claimed that the crisis
happened due to the unexpected low amount of rain in the summer of 2001. If this were
the case the increase in entry would not had been happening already in the year 2000. This
is in accordance to the argument made by Anuatti and Hochstetler [2] that deviations from
the long term average amount of rain as the one in 2001 is not unusual and the system
is designed to withstand large deviations from this average when operating within a safe
margin. A closer inspection to Figure 3 shows a rising trend for the spot price after the early
months of 1999. It was known for the players in the industry that water levels in the dams
were getting unusually lower. The year dummies and the yearly average spot price have a
correlation of 0.7 over the 1995 to 2001 period. Figure 4 plots the year eﬀects and the spot
price.
7 Discussion of Results and Assumptions
The externality has a positive eﬀect on entry decisions and it is an increasing function of
the regularization of the river ﬂow done by the upstream plants. As a way to understand the
meaning of the estimated coeﬃcient of the externality I calculate the entry probability for the
locations available on the Uruguay river basin in southern Brazil. Figure 5 is a picture of the
29Table 6: Entry Probabilities - Uruguay Basin
Plant Cascade Distance P(entry)(1) P(entry)(2) Ratio
Order* (next plant) (without ext) (with ext) (2)/(1)
Pai Quere 1 102 0.178 0.178 0.00
Barra Grande 2 100 0.218 0.240 10.23
So Roque 1 38 0.142 0.142 0.00
Garibaldi 2 59 0.152 0.175 15.22
Campos Novos 3 87 0.298 0.300 0.87
Machadinho 6 141 0.238 0.250 4.69
Ita 7 132 0.225 0.231 2.50
Passo Fundo 1 55 0.240 0.240 0.00
Monjolinho 2 86 0.174 0.300 72.63
Quebra Queixo 1 151 0.210 0.210 0.00
Foz do Chapeco 11 120 0.144 0.186 29.57
Itapiranga 12 360 0.174 0.200 15.10
Sao Jose 1 70 0.145 0.145 0.00
Passo de S. Joao 2 130 0.153 0.154 0.09
Garabi 15 0 0.050 0.054 7.52
* The number on the cascade order column in fact refers to the numbers of plants
upstream.
Uruguay Basin in southern Brazil with the plants marked on it. I assume that all locations
are still available and therefore the entry decisions are based on the expected externality. The
ﬁrst three columns of table 6 show the name of the locations, their locations on the cascade
order and the distance to the next downstream plant. The fourth column shows the entry
probabilities without the eﬀect of the externality, equivalent to set the coeﬃcient of Ext to
zero. The ﬁfth column shows the probabilities with the externality and the last column is
the percentage increase in the entry probability for the two cases. The entry probability is
substantially larger for some of the downstream plants, getting as far as 73 percent higher
for Monjolinho, showing that the externality eﬀect is not negligible. There is clearly a bias
toward entry in downstream locations.
An alternative explanation for the rise in the dummy coeﬃcients of year 2000 and after
is the fact that some institutional change brought credibility to the regulatory process and
decreased the risk of investment. There were four important landmarks in his industry: the
privatization and the creation of the regulatory agency in 1995 and 1996, the creation of
30wholesale market, MAE, in 2000 and the crisis of 2001. The timing of the events excludes
the ﬁrst two for being the reason of the high entry of the 2000’s. The creation of MAE
in 2000 can be the source of an increase in credibility that reduced the regulatory risk and
attracted capital to the industry.
I argue that this was not the case. The ﬁrst reason is that the MAE was oﬃcially
created in 2000 but the set of rules that governs the market was created by its participants
in 1999. Hence, if MAE’s creation was the reason some anticipation would be expected
to occur and investments would increase before 2000. The second point, following Anuatti
and Hochstetler [2], is that there was a malfunctioning of the wholesale market in its infant
years due to absence of dispute resolution procedures and governance problems in general.
Also, the crisis created serious problems on the wholesale market that culminated in the
government intervention in 2001. The malfunction of the market rules together with the
intervention of 2001 indicates that the creation of the wholesale market was not enough to
bring stability to the regulatory environment and reduce the risk on new investments.
The data set has information about the entry order among the years of the sample.13 It
allows me to estimate the model using the entry order or, alternatively, disconsidering the
entry order and assuming that everyone enters at the same time. This assumption is made
on several empirical papers on entry, such as Berry [4] and Seim [16]. The usual reason for
this assumption is the fact that information on the entry order is not available.
The data set used in the estimation is an unbalanced panel, where an available location
that is chosen in a given year does not appear on the sample in the next period. Ignoring the
entry order is equivalent to getting rid of the panel structure of the data. Table 7 shows the
results of three diﬀerent estimations. The regression labeled ’Full Model’ is the one already
presented in the previous section. The ’Cross Sectional’ model treats the entry problem as a
one shot game, where everyone decides to enter at once. In this case, the temporal dimension
of the data set is lost since all entrants are assumed to make the decision at the same time.
13There is no information on the entry order within a year.
31Table 7: Cross Sectional and Panel Models
Cross Sectional Entry Order Full Model
Coef. Std Dev Coef. Std Dev Coef. Std Dev
Power 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003
Height 0.0047 0.0024 0.0029 0.0015 0.0068 0.0030
Area -0.0030 0.0076 -0.0017 0.0010 -0.0030 0.0021
DistSIN -0.0069 0.0073 -0.0052 0.0026 -0.0093 0.0054
N 0.7140 2.1058 0.1391 0.5026 0.0038 0.8773
NE -1.5766 2.6793 -1.2181 0.7343 -2.0506 1.1589








Ext 0.6737 0.2608 0.2304 0.0714 0.3080 0.1346
cte 0.0881 0.6625 -2.3800 0.2361 -5.4625 1.1358
σ 0.0000 0.2330 1.4779 0.8043
The model labeled ’Entry Order’ takes into account the entry order but does not include the
year dummies, to facilitate comparison with the cross sectional speciﬁcation.
The results show that ignoring the entry order signiﬁcantly change the coeﬃcient of the
externality. The value of the coeﬃcient of Ext goes from 0.30 in the full model to 0.67 in
the static model. This is not an artifact of the year dummies, since the model without the
year dummies gives estimates close to the ones from the full model.
8 Conclusion
This work develops a method to use entry data of hydroelectric generators to estimate
the proﬁt function. The main distinction of this method is providing a way to deal with the
externality in production that arise among plants operating on the same river. This exter-
nality arises from the dynamic nature of the hydroelectric generator’s problem and follows a
well deﬁned pattern with generators upstream positively aﬀecting the plants downstream, as
32shown by the theoretical model. This feature avoids the usual problem of multiplicity of equi-
librium in entry games, and provides a natural way to recursively calculate the equilibrium
probabilities.
The results obtained from the full model estimation are consistent with the theoretical
model in that the eﬀect of the externality is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The em-
pirical results show that ﬁrms have a positive incentive to locate downstream from existing
plants or locations where entry is likely to occur. An implication of this result is that entry
is likely to happen ﬁrst on the downstream locations of a river, and that once a generator
enters a given location the likelihood that someone enter downstream increases signiﬁcantly.
The characteristics of each location play a strong role in the decision to enter. Power
and height represent the energetic eﬃciency of the location, and therefore have a positive
correlation with proﬁts, although power is not signiﬁcant. The area of the reservoir is a
proxy of the installation cost of the plant, and show the high cost of ﬂooding large areas
and its negative impact on proﬁts. The region dummies capture the risk of congestion and
the diﬀerence in installation costs across the diﬀerent regions of the country. The results are
not conclusive in that locating far from the load centers has a negative impact on proﬁts.
Distance from the main transmission lines implies the cost of building the connection to the
main system, and it is an important factor on the location decision.
The model provides estimates of the change in market conditions for the diﬀerent years
covered by the sample. These estimates show a high coeﬃcient already in year 2000, one
year before the crisis of 2001, when spot prices reached unprecedent high levels (see Figure
3). It indicates that the contract market anticipated the excess demand that would be
generated by the water shortage. This conclusion has three strong implications. First, as
already mentioned it indicates that the crisis was not an unexpected event. Second, and more
important, it points out that there was a response in new entry due to a rising expectation
of a supply shortage in the future. It supports the eﬀectiveness of the contract market as
a decentralized mechanism to attract and allocate investments in new plants, going against
33the view that the crisis was a problem of misdesigned market institutions. In fact, the crisis
happened due to the length of time that the new plants require to begin operating, since the
length of time for a medium sized plant to start operating is 5 to 7 years. Third, despite
the fact that the market anticipated the crisis the centralized dispatch algorithm failed in
preventing it. Few months before the crisis the ISO was still dispatching the hydro plants
instead of turning on the thermo generators.
Finally, ignoring the entry order and treating the problem as a one shot game gives rise
to misleading coeﬃcients of the underlying problem. The estimation of a static entry game
overestimates the eﬀect of the interaction among the generators when compared to the result
obtained from the model which takes the sequential order of entry into account.
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37Figure 2: Locations Available in 1995




















































































40Figure 5: Uruguay Basin
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